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1. Introduction 
 
Deteriorating macroeconomic fundamentals lead governments to adopting 
formal stabilisation programmes. Credibility is important in designing and 
implementing macroeconomic policies, and particularly stabilisation 
programmes. The reason is that if stabilisation policies lack credibility they are 
likely to fail in achieving the desired objectives.
1
 But deciding on the exact 
features of a plan to curtail weakening macroeconomic fundamentals is a 
difficult task for policymakers. 
 The paper focuses on determining the performance of economies 
adopting different stabilisation programmes. The investigation asks the 
following question: Are exchange-rate-based stabilisation (ERBS) 
programmes more credible than money-based stabilisation (MBS) 
programmes?  
The literature on the topic is substantial and predicts that ERBS will 
have a larger effect than MBS. Calvo and Végh (1994) survey the theory and 
empirics on the topic; see also Rebelo and Végh (1995). The finding that 
ERBS are more credible matches the empirical regularity showing that such 
plans produce a boom followed by a bust, while MBS work in the opposite 
order. Assuming that the fiscal authorities are impatient, Tornell and Velasco 
(1998) show that MBS will yield better outcomes, in term of fiscal discipline 
and welfare, than ERBS programmes. There is also evidence that political 
                                                 
1
 In Flood’s (1983) model agents’ anticipation of a possible abandonment of the stabilization 
programme feeds a self-fulfilling process.  
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opportunism plays a role in the government’s choice of nominal anchor (e.g., 
Aisen, 2007). 
In measuring the impact of stabilisation it is critical to account for the 
announcement effect. The announcement effect measures the impact on inertia 
observed following the introduction of the programme and is expected to 
capture the perception of agents on the authorities’ ability to stabilize inflation. 
Depending on how people behave, various elements could determine the 
impact of announcing a programme, including the IMF’s reputation, the type 
of package being proposed, and the time remaining to the next political 
elections.  
The paper contributes by estimating the impact of ERBS vis-à-vis 
MBS using a panel of 19 countries with a history of stabilisation episodes. The 
analysis pays particular attention to measuring the announcement effect and its 
impact on credibility as captured by inflation inertia.
2
  Since inflation inertia is 
known to be closely related to the credibility on the stabilisation programme 
(Agénor and Taylor, 1992), the paper uses cross-section data to assess the 
impact that each nominal anchor has on reducing inertia at the time the 
programme is announced. The reduction in inertia is then compared among the 
different nominal anchors and among different regions to investigate the 
existence of regime-specific effects and region-specific characteristics linked 
to the stabilisation episodes. 
                                                 
2
 The selection of countries follows from previous studies on stabilization. In particular, 
Hamann (2001) and Easterly (1996) have used and extended this base of countries for the 
purpose of comparing IMF’s registered dates of stabilization and the dates the programmes are 
announced.  The paper uses Hamann (1991) criteria for the selection of stabilization dates. 
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 explains a model 
for measuring credibility. Section 3 runs econometric exercises for 
determining the impact of ERBS and MBS in a cross-section of countries. 
Section 4 concludes.   
 
 
2. Measuring credibility  
 
This section extends Edwards (1998), using interaction dummy variables for 
measuring the impact of credibility on inflation inertia in a panel of countries. 
In a cross-sectional setting, inflation can be represented by the following 
stacked stochastic process: 
 
                         (1) 
where     represents inflation,     is GDP growth and     is the error term 
capturing supply side shocks for            cross-sectional units observed 
for periods          , where the     represents a subsample of cross-
sectional units.  The   parameter represents the overall constant in the model, 
while the   and   represent inflation inertia and the impact of GDP growth 
respectively.
3
 If a stacked representation of these equations is employed and 
the specification is organized as a set of cross-section equations, it then 
                                                 
3
 Equation (1) follows from the traditional definition of inflation (e.g. Dornbusch, 1976; and 
Dornbusch and Simonsen, 1988). 
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follows that          and the general form of the unconditional error 
covariance matrix would be given by: 
 
          
 
  
 
                 
            
    
                
  
 
   (2) 
 
According to the literature, credibility on a stabilisation attempt can be 
approximated by changes in   at the time the stabilisation programme is 
announced (e.g. Edwards, 1996). This provides an approximation of the 
probable success that agents attribute to the programmes.
4
   The argument, 
pioneered by Sargent (1982), suggests that the effectiveness and cost of 
disinflation will depend on the credibility in the stabilization package.  
If stabilisation is credible, persistence will fall and   will drop when 
the programme is announced.  If stabilization lacks credibility the   will not 
respond to the announcement of the programme. Consequently, the evolution 
of   can offer relevant information about the performance and success of 
stabilisation.   
The announcement effect of stabilisation can be measured by using an 
impact dummy variable on inflation persistence:
5
 
                                                 
4
 The change in   reflects the announcement effect of stabilization. However, the 
implementation effect can be evaluated by looking at the recursive evolution of   after the 
programme is introduced (see Edwards, 2001).  
5
 See Obstfeld (1995) for a discussion on inflation persistence and the use of dummy variables 
in evaluating the impact of regime changes on inertial inflation. 
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                                  (3) 
 
where     are dummy variables that take the value of one in the year a specific 
country enters in a stabilisation programme and zero otherwise.  The   
coefficient measures the change in inflation persistence, assumed to capture 
the credibility impact of the stabilisation programme.  The larger the value of 
  the greater the credibility on the programme and the smaller the value of   
the lower the credibility on the stabilisation attempt.   
In addition, the framework allows measuring the credibility of 
alternative nominal anchors within specific regions. For example, the cross-
sectional unit   can be limited to include selected countries within a region 
and the dummy variables can be restricted to a specific type of anchor. 
Looking at the credibility between ERBS and MBS programmes for 
selected regions, would require extending the model as follows: 
 
                                    (4) 
 
where the subscript j represents the type of anchor been evaluated. In 
particular,       measures the impact on inertia of ERBS whereas       
measures the impact of MBS programmes. For example, if       is 
statistically larger than      would imply that ERBS is more credible than 
MBS programmes.  If one of the coefficients is not statistically significant, 
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however, the credibility impact of that specific anchor is negligible.  If both 
coefficients are significant but not statistically different from each other, 
would imply that no additional impact can be attributed to a specific nominal 
anchor. 
 
3. Empirical modelling 
 
Equation (4) was estimated using pooled IV two-stages least squares. 
The instruments include the constant, lagged values of inflation and GDP 
growth rates. An ordinary coefficient covariance method was used provided 
that is unlikely to observe cross-equation correlations and heteroskedasticity 
across regions.
6
  
Following Hamann (2001), the analysis employs a panel of 19 
countries with a total of 16 ERBS and 23 MBS episodes. The stabilization 
dates and type of nominal anchor follow from the IMF classification. In 
particular, IMF programs that fall within a stand-by agreement or structural 
adjustment programs where selected.
7
 Other form of stabilization, including 
unorthodox programs, where disregarded. 
Annual data was used in computing inflation and aggregate demand for 
each country.
8
 The data ranges from 1960 up to 2004 with a total of 812 
                                                 
6
 Nevertheless, various robust covariance methods where tested without any meaningful 
changes in the result. 
7
 Reported stabilization dates come from the IMF website, and are cross- referenced with 
Tornell and Velasco’s (1998) samples. 
8
 Inflation is approximated by the change in the log of the consumer price index (CPI), and 
aggregate demand by the change in the log of nominal gross domestic product (GDP). Data 
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unbalanced pooled observations. The set is unbalanced provided that some 
countries such as Brazil, Nicaragua, and Zambia, have different sample 
lengths.  
An important challenge of the exercise is in determining the dates of 
stabilisation.  As indicated by Easterly (1996), the IMF reported dates of a 
stabilisation programme differ from the dates inflation is actually stabilize. As 
a benchmark, Table 1 shows the actual dates of stabilisation and those under 
Hamann (2001) and Easterly (1996). The data confirms an average delay of 
one year for stabilisation to bringing down inflation when the programme is 
regarded as successful. For example, out of the 39 stabilisation episodes only 
14 where successful under Easterly (1996), and 24 under Hamann (2001). The 
exercise uses Hamann (2001) as the reference.
9
  
 
4. Cross-section analysis 
 
Table 2 presents the results of estimating equation (4) in the selected sample. 
There are four regression groups based on the different regions and two 
regressions per group relating to ERBS and MBS programmes.  
The FULL sample includes the complete set of countries. The Latin 
American (LATAM) sample includes Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa 
                                                                                                                                
for CPI and GDP comes from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) International Financial 
Statistics (IFS). 
9
 This paper extends the sample to include the Dominican Republic 1985, Chile 1964, Ecuador 
1983 and 1984, Mexico 1995, Nigeria 1993, Turkey 1999, and Venezuela 1993 stabilization 
episodes. 
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Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, 
Uruguay and Venezuela. The NONLATAM sample includes Israel, Iceland, 
Turkey, Zambia, Nigeria and Uganda, whereas the Caribbean (CA) sample 
includes the Dominican Republic and Jamaica.   
In the FULL sample, the regressions have 52 observations, 19 cross-
sections and 745 pooled unbalanced observations.  The LATAM sample has 
52 observations, 13 cross-sections and 563 pooled unbalanced observations. 
For the NONLATAM sample, the regressions have 52 observations, 6 cross-
sections and 182 pooled unbalanced observations. Finally, the CA sample has 
only one regression for MBS episodes with 48 observations, 2 cross-sections 
and 89 pooled observations. All of the pooled cross-section regressions show 
adequate statistics and fit. In addition, the variables are significant and with 
the correct signs. Lagged inflation and GDP growth variables where expected 
to be positive, while the interaction dummy variables where expected to be 
zero or negative. 
Looking at inflation inertia alone, a Wald test on the coefficients of 
lagged inflation indicates that there are no significant differences among 
countries and between nominal anchors.
10
 For the FULL sample, the test 
cannot reject the null of equal inertial coefficients among ERBS and 
MBS                       . Similarly, for the LATAM and 
NONLATAM samples, the test cannot reject the null of equal 
coefficients                                                      . 
                                                 
10
 See Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) for a general discussion on Wald test. 
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The results imply that the choice of the nominal anchors in not associated with 
the level of inflation persistence prior to launching the stabilization 
programme.   
There are, however, significant differences among inertia levels 
between regions.  For example, the NONLATAM and the CA regions have 
higher levels than the LATAM and the FULL sample regressions regardless of 
the nominal anchors being pursue.  None of the regions showed unit roots 
suggesting mean reversion within these inflation processes.   
There are also significant regional differences when measuring the 
impact of GDP growth over inflation.  For example, the impact is much lower 
in the NONLATAM and in the CA regions compared to the full sample. The 
Wald test rejected the null of equal coefficients when comparing the 
coefficients of GDP growth among the NONLATAM and the FULL sample 
within the EBRS group                      . Similar results are 
obtained when comparing the LATAM with the CA region. It appears that 
inflation is more sensitive to demand pressures in the LATAM countries than 
in the rest of the regions.  
The analysis moves on to the issue of credibility as measured by an 
impact dummy variable on lagged inflation. According to the literature, if 
inflation inertial drops when stabilisation is announced, the programme can be 
regarded as credible.  The impact dummy measures the credibility impact of 
stabilisation, and allows comparing it among different nominal anchors and 
within different regions. 
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Looking at the FULL sample, the impact dummy on both ERBS and 
MBS where negative and statistically significant indicating that both types of 
nominal anchors had a meaningful credibility effect.  When comparing the 
credibility impact in absolute terms, however, the Wald test cannot reject the 
null of equal coefficients among nominal anchors                 
0.183. This implies that the announcement effect is similar among 
stabilization strategies.  However, the correct way to compare among 
programs is by evaluating the relative impact that the stabilization program 
has on inertia, which can be measures dividing the coefficient of the impact 
dummy by the coefficient of lagged inflation. This provides a measure of how 
much inflation inertia drops relative to its level prior to stabilization when the 
programme is introduce.  
Table 2 also presents this calculation under the row named “relative LI 
drop”.11 Using this approach on the FULL sample, the Wald test shows that 
ERBS produces a higher drop in inertia than MBS                 
      . The drop is substantial with a 76% under ERBS vs. 56% under 
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 The standard errors for these relative coefficients can be obtained by adapting Bårdsen’s 
(1989) formulae for calculating the variance of ratio coefficients in standard LE and IV 
regressions:  
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where        is the ratio coefficient for the variables x and y.  In this setup, x is the 
dummy variable coefficient on lagged inflation and y is the coefficient of lagged inflation. 
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MBS.
12
  This result confirms the conventional wisdom that ERBS is more 
credible than MBS at the time of announcement.   
Similar results are obtained for the LATAM group in which the drop in 
inertia is significantly but similar in absolute terms among both anchors.  In 
relative terms, however, Wald test
 
rejected the null of equal 
coefficients                       , indicating that ERBS has a higher 
credibility impact with a relative drop of 79% vs. 56%.  For the NONLATAM 
countries, however, the inertia effect is significant but the Wald test cannot 
reject the null of equal coefficient among both anchors in either absolute or 
relative terms                       . 
The Caribbean countries only include MBS episodes.
13
 The degree of 
inflation persistence in the Caribbean countries was on average higher than in 
the rest of the sample, and the impact of credibility is also the highest both in 
absolute and relative terms.  For example, in absolute terms the coefficient of 
the dummy variable shows a drop of about 49%, significantly larger than the 
full sample MBS coefficient with an average drop of about 12.5%         
              . In relative terms, the drop in inertia is above 90%, which 
is also the highest among the regions. It appears that stabilization has a more 
profound effect in the Caribbean countries than in other parts of the world.
14
 
                                                 
12
 The Wald test is performed on the ratio of the impact dummy coefficient to the coefficient 
of lagged inflation, which is a measure of the percentage that inertia drops at the time of 
announcement relative to average inertia.  Average inertia in this case is measured by the 
coefficient on lagged inflation. 
13
 It has been argued that the IMF lends limited support for ERBS programmes to countries 
that have less substantial influence in the world economy (Stiglitz, 2003).   
14
 It should be noted that this result could be influenced by the fact that the Caribbean sample 
only includes the Dominican Republic and Jamaica. 
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Tables 3 and 4 show the persistence coefficients of both ERBS and 
MBS for the full sample over ten years windows.
15
 The results indicate that 
through time, ERBS has been more credible than MBS programmes 
supporting the most of the results found in the literature.  However, the impact 
was substantially higher in the 70’s than in the 80’s and the 90’s. The results 
suggest that the credibility gap related to the announcement effect associated 
with MBS and ERBS programmes, has gradually disappeared. This is perhaps 
because the design and implementation of stabilization strategies have 
improved over time.  The biggest jump happened between the 1970s and the 
1980s. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The analysis shows that ERBS is, on average, more credible than MBS. The 
finding confirms the conventional wisdom at least when evaluating the 
announcement effect of the programs over inflation inertia. The credibility gap 
is substantial among nominal anchors and among regions.  
The LATAM region has the largest credibility gap between ERBS and 
MBS while the gap is not meaningful within the NONLATAM countries. The 
analysis also reveals that the gap varies over time. The gap was larger during 
the 70’s than in the 80’s and 90’s.  In general, the cross-sectional evidence 
                                                 
15
 Table 3 uses the absolute inertial impact as measured by the coefficient on the stabilization 
dummy variable. Table 4 uses the relative impact on inertial inflation calculated as the ratio of 
the coefficient on the stabilization dummy variable to the coefficient on inflation inertia. The 
first estimation restricts the sample to a range from 1960 up to 1979, and adds 10 year 
windows to each subsequent calculation until the complete set is used. 
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suggests that IMF stabilization programs do have a significant announcement 
effect over inertia, with the largest effect in the CA followed by LATAM 
region.  
From a policy perspective, countries could benefit from negotiating 
and implementing ERBS type programmes. However, the evidence suggests 
that recently the gap coming for the announcement effect of each type of 
strategy has substantially disappeared. There is also evidence that the choice 
of the nominal anchor is not associated with the level of inflation persistence 
prior to stabilization and is perhaps linked to the size and relative importance 
of the country or region in relation to the rest of the world. 
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Table 1: IMF stabilization dates, anchor type and success criteria 
Criteria 1 Criteria 2
Argentina 1 Latin America 1976 1977 1977 Yes Yes
Argentina 2 Latin America 1980 1980 Yes
Argentina 3 Latin America 1985 1986 1986 Yes Yes
Argentina 4 Latin America 1991 1991 1991 Yes Yes Yes
Bolivia Latin America 1985 1986 1986 Yes Yes
Brazil 1 Latin America 1965 1966 1966 Yes Yes Yes
Brazil 2 Latin America 1990 1991 1991 Yes
Chile 1 Latin America 1964 1965 1965 Yes Yes
Chile 2 Latin America 1974 1975 1976 Yes Yes
Chile 3 Latin America 1977 1978 1978 Yes Yes
Costa Rica Latin America 1982 1983 1983 Yes Yes
Dominican Republic 1 Caribbean 1985 1986 Yes
Dominican Republic 2 Caribbean 1991 1992 1992 Yes
Ecuador Latin America 1983
Ecuador Latin America 1984 1984 Yes
Ecuador Latin America 1988 1990 1990 Yes
Ecuador Latin America 1992 1994 1994 Yes Yes
Iceland Other 1976 1976 1976 Yes
Iceland Other 1983 1984 1984 Yes Yes
Israel Other 1985 1986 1986 Yes Yes Yes
Jamaica Caribbean 1992 1993 1993 Yes
Mexico Latin America 1983 1984
Mexico Latin America 1987 1989 1989 Yes Yes
Mexico Latin America 1995 1997 Yes Yes
Nicaragua Latin America 1991 1991 1992 Yes Yes Yes
Nigeria Other 1990 1990
Nigeria Other 1993 1994 1994 Yes
Peru Latin America 1985 1986 1986 Yes Yes
Peru Latin America 1990 1991 1991 Yes Yes
Turkey Other 1980 1981 1981 Yes
Turkey Other 1999 2000 Yes Yes
Uganda Other 1981 1982
Uganda Other 1988 1989 1989 Yes Yes
Uruguay Latin America 1969 1969 1969 Yes Yes
Uruguay Latin America 1975 1976 1978 Yes
Uruguay Latin America 1980 1981 Yes Yes Yes
Uruguay Latin America 1990 1992 Yes Yes Yes
Venezuela Latin America 1989 1990 Yes
Zambia Other 1993 1994 1994 Yes Yes
Sources: Haman (2001), Easterly (1996), Tornell and Velasco (1998), IFS, National Sources and authors' calculations.
Exchange 
rate anchor
Successful
Country Region
Beginning 
date
Stabilization 
date 1, 2
Stabilization 
date 3
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Table 2: Cross-section regressions on inflation for selected regions.
ERBS MBS ERBS MBS ERBS MBS ERBS MBS
Constant -0.039 -0.042 -0.030 -0.033 -0.044 -0.046 -0.036
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) 0.011 (0.009)
Lagged inflation (LI) 0.206 0.223 0.185 0.201 0.470 0.446 0.505
(0.014) (0.015) (0.023) (0.035) (0.045) (0.044) (0.063)
GDP growth 0.846 0.841 0.867 0.863 0.567 0.591 0.664
(0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.027) (0.045) (0.044) (0.059)
LI x ALL dum -0.156 -0.125
(0.024) (0.019)
LI x LATAL dum -0.147 -0.112
(0.047) (0.030)
LI x NONLATAM dum -0.293 -0.256
(0.068) (0.068)
LI x CA dum -0.490
(0.074)
Relative LI drop* -0.759 -0.561 -0.791 -0.559 -0.622 -0.575 -0.970
(0.120) (0.090) (0.142) (0.106) (0.159) (0.164) (0.189)
Obs 52 52 52 52 52 52 48
Cross-sections 19 19 13 13 6 6 2
Pool Obs 745 745 563 563 182 182 89
R2 0.943 0.943 0.950 0.950 0.889 0.887 0.836
DW 1.319 1.436 1.272 1.419 1.788 1.738 1.928
SE 0.121 0.121 0.125 0.125 0.096 0.097 0.045
Source: Estimation of the author. Standard errors in parenthesis. * denotes significance at the 1% level.
Full Sample (ALL) LATAM Non-LATAM CARIB
* * * * * *
* * * * * *
* * * * * *
* *
* *
* *
*
*
*
*
* * * * * * *
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Table 3: Announcement effect over sub-sample (absolute terms)
Sample ERBS* ?? MBS* Gap** 2(1)†
-0.273 -0.150 0.123 8.475
(0.12) (0.04) (8.48) (0.00)
-0.103 -0.040 0.063 4.64
(0.05) (0.04) (4.64) (0.03)
-0.184 -0.125 0.059 3.8
(0.04) (0.03) (3.80) (0.05)
-0.156 -0.125 0.031 3.478
(0.02) (0.02) (3.48) (0.06)
Source: authors' estimations. Notes: * figures in parentheses are t-statistics. ** 
figures in parentheses are 2 statistics. † figures in parentheses are p-values.
70's
80's
90's
Full
>
>
>
>
Table 4: Announcement effect over sub-sample (relative to average inertia)
Sample ERBS* ?? MBS* Gap 
2
(1)†
-1.326 -0.510 0.816 52.57
(0.12) (0.04) (52.57) (0.00)
-0.835 -0.311 -0.835 3.79
(0.05) (0.04) (3.79) (0.05)
-0.767 -0.571 -0.767 2.69
(0.04) (0.03) (2.69) (0.10)
-0.759 -0.561 -0.759 3.76
(1.68) (1.22) (3.76) (0.05)
90's >
Full >
Source: authors' estimations. Note: * figures in parentheses are t-statistics. ** figures in parentheses are 

2
 statistics. † figures in parenthesis are p-values.
70's >
80's >
